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Using the same standard of review, the court then reviewed the
district court's limitation of Quigley's easement rights, which limited
the size of machinery Quigley could bring onto Graveley's property to
maintain and repair the Quigley Ditch, and which required Quigley to
access Graveley's property using specific vehicles and specific routes.
The court affirmed all of these limitations except the one limiting the
size of machinery Quigley could use to repair and maintain his ditch.
The court reasoned that limiting Quigley to the use of smaller
equipment could be dangerous and much less effective than using
larger equipment. Thus, the court ordered that Quigley be permitted
to use any equipment designed for ditch repair and maintenance, so
long as such equipment would not damage Graveley's property or
expand the current dimensions of the Quigley Ditch.
Next, the court determined whether the district court erred in
finding both Quigley and Graveleyjointly liable for the washout. The
court reviewed the evidence brought before the district court, which
consisted of two credible, though contradictory reasons for the
washout. Evidence presented by Quigley blamed the washout on
Graveley's recent remodeling of the Graveley Ditch, while evidence
presented by Graveley blamed the washout on the Quigley Ditch
carrying too much water. The court concluded that the district court's
apportionment of equal fault to both parties was not erroneous, and
therefore affirmed the finding.
The court also affirmed the district court's order that Quigley pay
Graveley's attorney's fees. The court found the lower court had
correctly applied the relevant state statute entitling the prevailing party
to reasonable attorney's fees. According to the district court, Graveley
prevailed on the only claim he brought against Quigley-an
encroachment claim-and was therefore correctly awarded attorney's
fees.
Next, the court reviewed the lower court's refusal to grant Quigley
a new trial regarding an injunction temporarily limiting Quigley's
ditch flow to 400 miner's inches until he could prove it was safe to
transport more. The court affirmed the district court's ruling, which
was based on Quigley's failure to present new evidence sufficient to
prove this fact. Lastly, the Court found that the lower court had not
abused its discretion when determining the amount of damage
suffered by each party due to the washout. The court therefore
affirmed this determination.
Kate Osborn
Geil v. Missoula Irrigation Dist., 59 P.3d 398 (Mont. 2002) (holding
legislation permitting irrigation district members to petition for
exclusion from the district for taxation purposes did not violate
district's rights to equal protection or due process).
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COURT REPORTS

Raymond Geil and over 500 additional individuals sought to
exclude their land from taxation by the Missoula Irrigation District
("MID"). Although legislation authorized irrigation districts to tax
district members to pay for irrigation expenses, district members could
petition for exclusion if the irrigation district did not currently serve
the land in question. The District Court for the Fourth Judicial
District consolidated the claims and appointed a special master. After
reviewing the special master's recommendations, the court issued a
Notice of Intent to enter a final order exempting Geil's property from
MID taxation. Despite MID's objection, the district court ultimately
issued the final order. On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court,
MID argued three major points: first, the legislation denied MID's
right to equal protection; second, the legislation denied MID's right to
due process; and third, the court's ruling violated the principle of res
judicata with respect to a 1922 court decree finding all of the land
within the MID susceptible to irrigation. The Montana Supreme
Court affirmed the district court's rulings.
In 1909, the Montana legislature passed legislation ("Act")
authorizing the establishment of irrigation districts. Pursuant to the
Act, groups of landowners within a district could petition the district
court for exclusion from taxation if the district's irrigation system
could not successfully irrigate their lands. In 1997, the legislature
temporarily amended the Act (the "Amendment"). The Amendment
loosened those petition requirements, allowing individual landowners
with smaller tracts to request exclusion. Although worded in general
terms, the Montana legislature intended, as evidenced by the
legislative history, for the Amendment to apply only to the MID. MID
challenged the Amendment's constitutionality because it believed
granting the numerous petitions resulting from the Amendment
would result in increased assessments for the remaining district
members.
After ruling MID had standing to challenge the constitutionality of
the Act, the court addressed whether the Act deprived MID of its right
to equal protection under the law. In addressing the equal protection
challenge, the court first identified the classes and determined
whether they were similarly situated. MID argued the Act subjected
MID to a law that did not apply to other similarly situated
districts. The court agreed, finding the legislature intended the
Amendment to apply only to the City of Missoula, and that other
urban districts not covered by the Amendment were similarly situated.
Using rational basis review, the court then addressed whether the
Act violated MID's right to equal protection. Under rational basis
review, the government must have shown the Amendment's objective
was legitimate and the objective bore a rational relationship to the
classification used by the legislature. Citing the trial court's finding
that the legislature intended to ensure only those persons who used
the irrigation works should pay for them, the court held that purpose
to be legitimate.
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The court then addressed whether the purpose bore a rational
relationship to the legislature's classification. MID argued that the
purpose-ensuring only those persons who used irrigation works
should pay for them-was not rationally related to a provision that
only applied to the City of Missoula. In resolving public welfare issues,
a legislature is free to deal with one class at a time. Thus, the court
affirmed the district court's holding that the legislative classification
was rationally related to its objective.
MID also argued the Amendment deprived the district and its
members of due process. First, MID argued the notice provision was
deficient by only requiring a petitioner to mail a petition to the
irrigation district and not to every landowner in the district. Second,
MID argued the Amendment did not provide members an opportunity
to be heard regarding the petition. Specifically, MID alleged the
Amendment did not provide it the opportunity to show users could
feasibly obtain water from the irrigation district.
"Notice sufficiently comports with due process if it is reasonably
calculated, under all circumstances, to inform parties of proceedings
which may directly affect their legally protected interests." MID
argued sufficient notice required a petitioner mail notice to all district
members. However, when arguing it had standing to bring suit, MID
claimed it represented the interests of its members. The court found
MID's notice argument disingenuous given its conflicting earlier
position when arguing for standing.
The court also found MID had an opportunity to show users could
obtain water from the district. Due process requires an opportunity to
be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Under
the Amendment, a district could file an objection to a petition within
15 days. Further, the district court in the instant case held two
hearings regarding MID's objections. For these reasons, the court
held the Amendment afforded Geil due process.
Finally, MID argued res judicata prevented Geil from arguing his
land was not susceptible to irrigation after the original 1922 decree
found all land within the district susceptible to irrigation. Resjudicata
bars litigation if the following four criteria are met: "(1) the subject
matter of each action must be the same; (2) the parties or their privies
of each action must be the same; (3) the issues must be the same and
relate to the same subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons
must be the same in reference to the subject matter and to the issues
between them." The court found the subject matter differed. In 1922,
the subject involved establishment of the MID, whereas the instant
case involved exclusion from the irrigation district.
Therefore, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's ruling.
Brian L. Martin

